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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:
Case No. 890657-CA

Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

:
:

BRUCE AARON ELLIS,

Priority No. 2

I

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction for aggravated
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-103 (1990), in the Third Judicial District Court in and for
Salt Lake County, the Honorable Scott Daniels, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did defendant make a request for an included

offense instruction on simple assault?

An issue not raised at

the trial level cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
State in the Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289, 1291 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
2.

Did the trial court err in admitting photographs

offered to prove an element of the offense over defendant's
objections that the photographs were gruesome, prejudicial, and

not unusually probative; and if so, was the error harmless?

A

trial court's ruling on evidentiary matters is reviewed for abuse
of discretion such that there is a likelihood that injustice
resulted.

State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 604 (Utah 1985).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and

rules are compiled in an Appendix where not set forth in the body
of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Bruce Aaron Ellis, was charged by
information with aggravated assault, a third degree felony, under
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) (R. 6-7). Prior to trial
defendant made a motion in limine to exclude photos depicting
wounds inflicted on the victim, Steven Drew, which motion was
denied (R. 18-21).

At trial, the jury was instructed under

subsection 76-5-103(1)(b) only.

Defendant was convicted at

trial, sentenced to a term not to exceed five (5) years and
ordered to pay a fine of $5,000.00.

The sentence was stayed and

defendant was placed on probation for eighteen (18) months (R.
1
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990) provides:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he
commits assault as defined in Section 76-5102 and he:
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) uses a dangerous weapon as defined
in Section 76-1-601 or other means or
force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a third degree
felony.

89).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On June 29, 1989, Steven Drew drove Stephan Evans home
after work (Transcript of September 27, 1989, hereinafter "TA.M
58-9).

En route they noticed the parked truck of Dale Purdy, a

fellow worker who had not appeared for work that day (TA. 59).
They asked people standing nearby if Purdy or his girlfriend were
around (TA. 60). State's witnesses Evans and Drew both testified
that defendant appeared at this point and apparently inquired of
Evans whether the truck was worth buying for an "eight-ball" (TA.
60 and 89-91), though defendant denies these assertions (TA. 15253).
Thereafter, Drew and Evans drove to Purdy's house, and
told him that they had seen his truck (TA. 63 and 93) and that it
might be sold (TA. 72). Evans and Drew both testified that they
knew Purdy was upset about his missing truck and that somehow his
girlfriend, Dianne Konecny (TA. 119), was involved, she having
left him to care for their children (TA. 112 and 126). Drew then
drove towards Evans' house with the intention of leaving Evans
and Purdy off (TA. 64 and 93). En route they found the truck
parked at a new location, defendant's house (TA. 64, 93, 120 and
136).
At this point defendant and the State's witnesses
testified to markedly different events. With minor
discrepancies, the State's witnesses testified that Purdy
approached defendant, who appeared on the scene shortly after
their arrival, and asked if Dianne was there, how the truck came

to be there and where the keys were.

All testified that

defendant responded that Dianne was not there, the truck had run
out of gas and that he would not give them the keys (TA. 64-66,
93-94 and 120-122).

Purdy testified that he also informed

defendant that the truck was his. (TA. 122). All three of the
State's witnesses testified that this conversation occurred
essentially contemporaneously with or just prior to their
attempting to push the truck down the street towards Evans' house
(T. 65-66, 94 and 122). All witnesses, including defendant,
testified that at this point defendant was on the porch and that
Drew was on the street (TA. 75, 97, 106, 124 and 138). Drew
testified that the porch was about three feet above the street
level (TA. 97). He and Evans each testified that defendant and
Drew were about ten to fifteen feet apart with a fence or a porch
railing between them (TA. 75-81, 96, 105 and 160-61).

Evans and

Drew testified that defendant was holding a heavy glass as thick
as a small mason jar (TA. 67-68 and 96). Evans and Purdy
testified that just prior to the incident, defendant had been
drinking from the glass (TA. 76 and 131).
According to Drew, he asked defendant several more
times for the keys and defendant responded that he did not have
the keys and would not give up the keys (TA. 94-95).

At this

point, defendant and Drew exchanged profanities, when, according
to Evans and Drew defendant suddenly threw the glass at Drew,
simultaneously uttering words to the effect, "I am going to kill
you." (TA. 67 and 75).

The glass hit the fence, cracked and then struck the
back of Drew's leg, causing a deep gash (TA. 67 and 95). Evans,
Drew and Purdy each testified that immediately after the glass
shattered on Drew's leg defendant said, in effect, "Now I am
going to blow your f

g head off," whereupon he headed for the

doorway of the house (TA. 68, 80, 98-99 and 124). Purdy
immediately then took Drew to the hospital, while Evans went home
and called the police (TA. 68).
Defendant testified as follows:

Prior to the incident

at issue in this case, Purdy's girlfriend Dianne told him the
truck belonged to her, and asked him if he knew anybody who would
buy the truck from her (TA. 154). He never had the keys to the
truck, which was parked in his driveway when Drew, Evans and
Purdy appeared.

Upon arrival, Purdy asked defendant where Dianne

was, and defendant allowed Purdy to enter the house to speak with
her.

She refused to give him the keys unless he gave her the

children (TA. 134-37).
Upon Purdy's leaving the house, he told Evans and Drew,
still in Drew's truck, that he could not get the keys.

Evans and

Drew jumped out of the truck, Evans and Purdy entered the front
gate and Drew immediately grabbed what appeared to be either a
tire iron or a pry bar from the rear of his truck and started
over the fence (TA. 137-138).
Defendant testified that the fence was "right up next
to the porch" (TA. 138). In fear of his life, he threw the
glass, from which he had been drinking (TA. 138), intending to
stop Drew, who was only one or two feet from him, from coming

over the fence (TA. 138, 142 and 147-48).

Defendant also

testified that he threw the glass with his right arm because he
was unable to use his left arm, his usual throwing arm (TA. 143).
(Drew acknowledged that defendant threw the glass "off hand" (TA.
107), but he and Evans denied that Drew ever approached defendant
or the porch (TA. 76 and 105), and all three of the State's
witnesses denied that there were either tools or a tire iron in
Drew's truck (TA. 76, 111 and 130) or that Drew wielded such-like
weapon (TA. 132).)
On the question of his intent, defendant testified that
he threw the glass, just a regular round tumbler (TA. 138), as
hard as he could with his right arm intending to hit and stop
Drew.

He was uncertain of the effect the glass would have or

whether he would be successful, and though he did not know
whether it would kill Drew, he figured it would probably break.
Defendant admitted that he exchanged profanities with Drew, but
denied that he ever said, "I'm going to kill you" or that he said
he was going to blow Drew's f

g head off (TA. 142-146).

As

soon as Drew was hit he jumped off the fence and dropped the tire
iron in his truck (TA. 149-151).
Concerning the injuries Drew suffered, the State
offered photographs depicting Drew's wound as it appeared upon
his arrival at the emergency room (State's Exhibits 6-8) and
following recovery (State's Exhibits 1-5), all which defendant
objected to (TA. 99-100 and 115-116).

The State also called Dr.

David Howe, Drew's treating physician (Transcript of September
25, 1989, hereinafter "TB." 3).

Dr. Howe, testifying from the State's exhibits, stated
as follows;

He was called to assist because the laceration was

larger than that emergency room doctors usually take care of (TB.
4).

The pictures show mainly the way the wound looked (TB. 4),

but that in one of them the wound appeared to be held open (TB.
4).

The wound was about four inches long, about one and a half

to two inches in depth and went down through the superficial
layers of the skin and fat into the body of the muscle (TB. 4-5).
A permanent scar resulted and while there is not protractive loss
of use of the leg, there is some permanent loss of muscle
function (TB. 7 and 11). Drew testified that he was unable to
run and play certain sports as a result of the cutting of his
hamstring muscle (TA. 101-102).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant never actually requested a lesser included
offense instruction on simple assault.

Rather, defendant (1)

requested that the case be submitted to the jury only on a simple
assault, and (2) sought a directed verdict on aggravated assault,
stating that a lesser included instruction had not been
requested.

The record makes clear that the trial court, with

good reason, never conceived that a request for a lesser included
instruction had been made.

This Court should therefore decline

to review this matter raised for the first time on appeal.
POINT II
The photographs to which defendant objects were offered
to prove that the victim had suffered serious bodily injury.

While graphic, they were not gruesome and were necessary to
illustrate a disputed element of the crime.

The Lafferty

standard, urged by defendant, does not apply because here the
victim was alive and the evidence was therefore not unnecessarily
cumulative; and therefore only an ordinary balancing is required
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence.

On balance the

photographs are more probative than prejudicial.

They were

necessary to insure that the State could sustain its burden of
proof and useful in illustrating corroborative testimony.

In any

event, their admission was harmless because of the overwhelming
evidence of defendant's guilt and the lack of emphasis placed on
them.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD DECLINE TO REVIEW
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM FOR A LESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE INSTRUCTION BECAUSE IT IS RAISED FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.
Defendant correctly states that he moved the court to
dismiss the aggravated assault and to submit the matter to the
jury as a simple assault (Appellant's Brief, at 8).

In support

of its argument to dismiss the aggravated assault count defendant
argued that the State had failed to show that the victim's
injuries were likely to produce serious bodily injury (TB. 1415).

Immediately following that argument the record proceeds

as follows:
2
The record is clear that the Court understood the proper
inquiry to be whether or not defendant used force likely to
produce serious bodily injury, notwithstanding defendant's skewed
presentation of the issue.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I don't think I
can take that from the jury. I think they
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that
serious bodily injury—the deep scar, a deep
cut, long cut, lots of tissue that was
damaged close to a nerve—I think they could
find that it was likely to create serious
bodily injury. I think the injury is pretty
serious, so I think under those circumstances
I'm going to deny that motion.
Anything further, Ms. Wells?
MS. WELLS: No, your Honor. I suppose I
would need to, for purposes of my record,
make a motion for a directive fsicl verdict
on forwarding the same theories, your Honor,
that this court should direct a verdict of no
more than—well, a verdict of not guilty.
We've not-we're not offering a lesser
included offense, so I believe that the court
should find that a jury cannot find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the state has proved
its case, and should direct a verdict of not
guilty.
THE COURT: Okay, that motion is on the
record, and for the record it will be denied.
(TB. 16)(emphasis added).
The plain reading of this record makes clear that
following defendant's argument the court was responding only to
his motion to dismiss the aggravated assault count.

Finding that

the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's
conduct was likely to produce serious bodily injury, the court
denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
further argument on motions.

The court then invited

Defendant moved only for a directed

verdict, specifically denying that its motion included an offer
for a lesser included offense.

The court then denied that

motion.
During the sentencing phase of the proceedings
defendant made another passing reference to a lesser included
offense:

[Defense counsel]: . . . This is a case
where, as we discussed informally, had a
lesser included offense been submitted, it
might well have been that the jury would have
returned a verdict of simple assault.
The Court: Probably would have—possibly
would have.
(TB. 45).
Defendant suggests that this "acknowledgment" proves
the court's error in not submitting a lesser included offense
instruction.

In so arguing, defendant, perhaps unwittingly, is

suggesting that the trial court not only made an error, but did
so in bad faith by knowingly refusing to instruct on simple
assault when it believed it appropriate.

On the contrary, the

court's statement really demonstrates that, with good reason, it
truly had no idea that a request for a lesser included
instruction had been presented to it.
In State in the Interest of M.S., 781 P.2d 1289 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), the Court stated:
It is a fundamental principle of
appellate review that matters not raised at
the trial level cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal. . . .
Id. at 1291 (Court declines to review where juvenile court judge
not given opportunity to rule on issues).

Having failed to

request a lesser included instruction on simple assault,
defendant is in no position to argue on appeal that the trial
court erred in not giving such an instruction.

State v. Pierce,

722 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (court would not
consider whether trial court's failure to give accomplice
instruction was abuse of discretion because defendant did not

request such an instruction at trial);

State v. Gandeef 587 P.2d

1064, 1067 (Utah 1978) (court refused to consider failure of
trial court to give lesser included offense instruction because
defendant did not request such an instruction at trial).

Based

on the record of proceedings in this case, this Court should also
decline to review defendant's claim that the trial court erred in
not giving a lesser included offense instruction on simple
assault.
POINT II
PHOTOGRAPHS OF DEFENDANT'S WOUNDS WERE
SUBSTANTIALLY PROBATIVE IN ILLUSTRATING
DEFENDANT'S USE OF FORCE LIKELY TO CAUSE
SERIOUS BODILY INJURY AND ARE NOT
PARTICULARLY GRUESOME.
Defendant argues that the admission of photographs
depicting Drew's wound, as it appeared upon his arrival at the
emergency room (State's Exhibits 6-8) and following recovery
(State's Exhibits 1-5), was erroneous under the Lafferty standard
because they were gruesome, not unusually probative, cumulative,
irrelevant and prejudicial.

All of these assertions are without

merit.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides, in
pertinent part:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
. . . or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence
In the absence of certain categories of relevant evidence which
have an unusually strong propensity to unfairly prejudice,
inflame or mislead a jury an analysis under rule 403 favors

admissibility.

State v. Mooref 788 P.2d 525, 527 (Utah Ct. App.

1990).3
"[T]he appraisal of probative versus prejudicial value
of evidence is entrusted to the discretion of the trial judge.
That discretion will not be upset on appeal absent manifest
error."

Ixi. at 527 (citations omitted);

accord State v. Valdezf

748 P.2d 1050, 1054 (Utah 1989) (photographs of murdered mother
and child admitted because not inflammatory and probative of
In Moore, the defendant, convicted of sexual exploitation of a
minor and distribution of pornographic material, sought the
exclusion of a homemade pornographic videotape on the ground that
it was within the category of evidence with an "unusual
propensity to unfairly prejudice, inflame or mislead the jury."
Jd. at 526. .See State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d, 1239, 1256 (Utah
1988). The court rejected defendant's claim, noting that
pornographic material was not recognized as belonging to such a
category of evidence. jEd. at 527.
In Lafferty the court recognized only 3 such
categories: (1) a rape victim's post sexual activities with
someone other than the accused; (2) statistical evidence of
matters not susceptible to quantitative analysis; and (3)
gruesome photographs of a homicide victim's corpse. Iji. at 1256.
Where evidence falls within one of these categories its probative
value is presumed to be substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. Id. at 1256.
Since Lafferty the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
restated the gruesome photograph category in terms relating only
to the corpses of homicide victims. See State v. Valdez, 748
P.2d 1050, 1054 (Utah 1989); State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221,
1229 (Utah 1989); State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 493 (Utah
19 8 8)(Z immerman, J., concurring).
In Lafferty the court pointed out that gruesome
photographs are often excluded because there is no legitimate
need for such evidence. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1256. In this
case the trial court distinguished Lafferty indicating that the
photos were being offered to prove whether or not the assault
produced serious bodily injury, a disputed element of the State's
case (TA. 3-5). The necessity to show serious bodily injury in
this aggravated assault case should preclude the application of
the Lafferty standard, which, if applied, would place the burden
on the State to show that the evidence's potential for unfair
prejudice does not outweigh its probativeness.

relevant issues).
Whether or not the Lafferty standard is applicable to
this case, this Court should at the outset consider, if not
determine, whether the photographs are "gruesome.,f
"[P]hotographs that are only negligibly gruesome have
little potential for unduly prejudicing the jury, and their
admission therefore does not constitute an abuse of discretion."
Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1055; see also State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512,
515 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (11 photographs depicting auto collision
scene and sheet-covered corpse displaying only tennis shoe-clad
foot, without visible blood stains, found only negligibly
gruesome and admissible to prove relevant facts).

Also, the

impact of otherwise objectionable photographs may be vitiated by
the manner in which they are displayed.

See Valdez, 748 P.2d at

1055 (photographs found not particularly bloody or gruesome where
displayed alongside non-objectionable photographs).
In this case the State offered eight separately mounted
color photographs, approximately 8" x 10". State's exhibits one
through five depicted Drew's scars following recovery.
photographs are clearly not gruesome.

Those

State's exhibits six,

seven and eight show the gaping wound caused by the thrown glass.
While stark, they are at most negligibly gruesome, depicting only
the severity of the injury to the body part.
Even if the photographs in question were determined to
be gruesome they might nonetheless be admissible if their
probative value outweighed the danger of unfair prejudice.

See

State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113, 117, 441 P.2d 512, 515 (Utah 1968).
In State v. Garcia, 663 P.2d 60 (Utah 1983), the court stated:

We have frequently stated and applied the
rule that color photographs of the body of
the victim - even photographs that are
gruesome - are not inadmissible if they are
probative of essential facts, even though
they may be cumulative of other evidence.
Id, at 63 (emphasis added); accord Pascoe 774 P.2d at 515
(quoting Garcia, 663 P.2d at 63); see also Valdez, 748 P.2d 1055
(availability of evidence from purely testimonial sources does
not by itself prevent the trial judge's admission of challenged
photographs); State v. Gee, 28 Utah 2d 96, 498 P.2d 662 (Utah
1972) (gruesome photographs of murdered 22-month old baby,
corroborative of other testimony, admissible where probative of
disputed element of crime).
Here, in order to obtain a guilty verdict on aggravated
assault the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant had thrown the glass with "force likely to produce
4
death or serious bodily injury."
Defendant argued that the
glass was not a deadly weapon, that defendant did not have the
requisite culpable state of mind when he threw the glass and that
defendant did not and could not have contemplated that the force
he used was likely to cause the injuries actually inflicted (TB.
28-33).

In defendant's disputing the existence of serious bodily

injury, the State necessarily had to employ all evidence
4

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1990), supra, note 1.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1990) provides:
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily
injury that creates or causes serious
permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily
member or organ, or creates a substantial
risk of death.

available to it.
The photographs graphically depict or serve as a basis
for inferring what the State had to prove—that defendant
committed an assault using force likely to produce serious bodily
injury.

Dr. Howe described the measurements of the wound (TB.

5), the process of closing the wound (TB. 5), its proximity to a
major nerve (TB. 6), and the fact of permanent scarring and
minor, though permanent, loss of muscle strength (TB. 7). None
of this testimony, however, could convey as clearly as the
challenged photographs just how serious an injury had been
sustained and the magnitude of force used by defendant in
inflicting it.
State v. Ross, 28 Utah 2d 279, 501 P.2d 632 (Utah
1972), supports the State's argument here that the photographs
were properly admitted on account of their probative value.
There the State introduced colored slides of the victim of a
brutal murder as she appeared at the crime scene.

Additionally,

a physician who performed an autopsy testified as to the victim's
multiple abrasions, contusions and lacerations which extended
over the entire body, her substantial internal injuries and the
cause of death.

In rejecting defendant's challenge to the

admission of the slides as cumulative and prejudicial, the court
stated: "In the instant action, the photographs were of probative
value in that they served to clarify and illustrate the testimony
of the pathologist as well as to illustrate the nature of the
attack made on the victim in a situation where malice was an
issue,"

JEd. at 635.

In this case, considering the illustrative

value of# at worst, negligibly gruesome photographs, the State
acted appropriately in introducing the photographs to sustain its
burden of proof.

See Gee, 28 Utah 2d at 100, 498 P.2d at 665

(gruesome, corroborating photographs properly admitted where
defendant pleaded not guilty and incumbent on prosecution to
prove each element of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable
doubt).
There are no Utah cases dealing with the introduction
of allegedly prejudicial photographs in injury-to-person offenses
apart from homicide cases.

However, State v. Hotchkiss, 525 A.2d

270 (N.H. 1987), is much to the point.

There, defendant was

convicted of assault in the second degree upon a five-week old
infant.

The crime required proof that the defendant "knowingly
5
or recklessly caused serious bodily injury to another. . . . "
Id. at 272.

"Serious bodily injury" is similar to that in Utah.

Id. at 272.

The defendant objected to a photograph showing the

infant victim in traction and vaguely depicting the bruise to his
thigh.

The trial court admitted the photograph because it

thought it useful to the jury to see that it was dealing with a
real person and not an abstract concept.

1A. at 271.

The New

Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the photograph was
admitted because it was relevant and because it "aidfed] in
making clear to the jury the oral descriptions of the [baby's]

J

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 631:2.

N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 625:11 defines "serious bodily injury"
to mean "harm to the body which causes severe, permanent or
protracted loss or impairment to the health or of the function of
any part of the body."

injuries."

jCd. at 273 (citation omitted).

Even if the photographs were erroneously admitted, the
error is harmless.

In State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988),

the Utah Supreme Court, finding the admission of gruesome
photographs had great potential for unfairly prejudicing the
defendant, laid out the harmless error standard;
In State v. Banner# we applied rule 30 of the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure to
nonconstitutional evidentiary error. That
rule directs in part, "Any error, defect,
irregularity or variance which does not
affect the substantial rights of a party
shall be disregarded." To the same effect is
rule 103(a) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
The Court in State v. Bishop/ unanimously
held that whether reversible error occurs
under rule 30 is determined by applying the
test found in State v. Fontana. In Fontana,
we held that "affect the substantial rights
of a party" means that an error warrants
reversal "only if a review of the record
persuades the [C]ourt that without the error
there was 'a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the defendant.'" In
Knight, the Court adopted an "erosion-ofconfidence" criterion to give substance to
our "reasonable likelihood" standard. We
stated that for an error to require reversal,
the likelihood of a different outcome must be
sufficiently high to undermine our confidence
in the verdict.
Id. at 477 (footnotes omitted).
Admission of potentially prejudicial photographs is
harmless where evidence of guilt is overwhelming.

State v.

Bishop, 753 P.2d at 477; State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257.
In this case only defendant's state of mind and whether
the glass was a deadly weapon or was thrown with force likely to
produce serious bodily injury were seriously at issue.

The jury

was properly instructed that recklessness was a culpable state of

mind for aggravated assault (Jury Instructions Nos. 11 and 13, R.
7
69 and 71). At trial defendant admitted that he threw the glass
at Drew and that he knew it would probably break (TA. 142-146).
The jury did not find defendant's conduct justified.

It is

beyond doubt that defendant's behavior was "reckless" under these
circumstances.

See State v, McElhaneyf 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978)

(recklessly committed aggravated assault where defendant threw
glass in victim's direction at close proximity).
As to "serious bodily injury," the State had merely to
demonstrate either "serious permanent disfigurement" or
p

"impairment of the function of any bodily member."

State's

exhibits one through five were at most somewhat cumulative and
clearly not gruesome.

They depict Drew's leg from various angles

and distances, and show a purplish scar four inches in length
which by any reasonable standard is a serious permanent
disfigurement.

Additionally, Dr. Howe testified as follows:

Q: What type of permanent dysfunction, if
any, will result from this wound?
A: Basically the scar, he'll have a
permanent scar that's there. He will,
because the muscle was involved in the cut,
will lose a little bit of the function of the
muscle. Muscle never heals back a hundred

No culpable mental state is specified under Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-103(b)(1990), nor is one specified under section 76-5-102,
providing for assault, which is incorporated in section 76-5-103.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1990) provides that when the
definition of an offense does not specify a culpable mental state
or involve strict liability, intent, knowledge or recklessness
shall be sufficient to establish criminal responsibility. Thus
defendant could be found guilty of aggravated assault if he
committed the requisite act recklessly. See State v. Royball,
710 P.2d 168, 170 (Utah 1985).
8

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(10) (1990), supra, note 2.

percent. It would be hard to test and show
that there's much difference, but he'll lose
a little bit of the strength.
(TB. 6-7).
Thus, evidence of defendant's guilt, entirely apart
from any effect the alleged gruesome photographs might have had,
was overwhelming.
This Court should also consider that the State did not
overplay the photographs in the course of using them for
legitimate purposes.

See Lafferty, 749 P.2d at 1257 (harmless

error where defendant's guilt overwhelming and prosecution did
not unduly emphasize or otherwise misuse the photographs); accord
Valdez, 748 P.2d at 1055.
In this case, the photographs were only very briefly
referenced during the State's direct examination of Drew (TA. 99100 and 115-116).

In response to defendant's objections, the

photographs were not published to the jury until after defendant
cross-examined Drew. The trial court then gave the jury a
cautionary instruction that the photographs would be further
explained by a doctor (TA. 100 and 115-117).

The record shows

that Dr. Howe's direct testimony from the photographs was also
brief and that the photographs were used only to illustrate the
existence of serious bodily injury (TB. 3-8). During Dr. Howe's
testimony the jury did not have the opportunity to view the
photographs.

Most importantly, the State did not display the

photographs during closing argument (TB. 19-27 and 36-39) and
referred to them only once, cautioning the jury in the same
sentence not to forget its common sense (TB. 19).

If the admission of photographs was error, then under
all the circumstances of this case that error was harmless.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that
defendant's conviction be affirmed.
DATED this /Lf
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APPENDIX

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

76-2-102. Culpable mental state required — Strict liability.
Every offense not involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental
state, and when the definition of the offense does not specify a culpable mental
state and the offense does not involve strict liability, intent, knowledge, or
recklessness shall suffice to establish criminal responsibility. An offense shall
involve strict liability if the statute defining the offense clearly indicates a
legislative purpose to impose criminal responsibility for commission of the
conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring proof of any culpable
mental state.
History: C. 1953, 76-2-102, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-102; 1983, ch. 90, ( 2.

76-5-102. Assault
(1) Assault is:
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to
another;
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to
do bodily injury to another; or
(c) an act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes bodily iryury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-102, enacted by L.
1974, ch. 32, § 38; 1989, ch. 51, § 1.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1974,
ch. 32, § 38 repealed former § 76-5-102, as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-5-102, relating
to assault, and enacted present § 76-5-102.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amend-

ment, effective April 24, 1989, added Subsection (l)(c).
Cross-References. — Bus hijacking, asgault with intent to commit, § 76-10-1504.
Power of city to prohibit assault and battery,
§ 10-8-47.

